Aabxtract

This gathering has spent ten rounds arguing whether pre-execution, independent-check accountability is the right design for the Foundation. The real, live executable already answers that question — it uses exactly this pattern on the Endowment, the single largest pool of money in the whole debate. This proposal extends the same, already-trusted pattern to what the executable doesn't yet cover, using a body — the Security Council — whose real, narrow, cancel-only mandate is itself proof the design works.

in ENS Governance8d ago

The Renewal Charter: What This Gathering's Ideas Are Actually For, Now That the Vote Has Moved

The executable already up for a real vote resolved most of the custody debate: tokens and the operational wallet stay with the DAO, the Endowment gets a 9-day timelock and Security Council cancellation right, and the real figure is $65M, not the $130M-$500M this gathering has been citing. That doesn't make ten rounds of work moot — it tells us exactly where it lands: at the two-year renewal point the executable itself already builds in.

in ENS Governance10d ago

The Missing Middle: A Dispute Ladder Between the DAO and the Foundation

Right now, if the DAO disagrees with the Foundation, there are only two paths: an advisory signal the Foundation can ignore, or a nuclear option. Nothing sits between them. A four-step, time-boxed ladder that works fully on its own, with two optional enhancements if other proposals in this gathering are also adopted.

in ENS Governance11d ago

Nobody Picks the Picker: A Rotating Roster for the ENS Foundation's Independent Directors

Every fix proposed for board selection still has someone discretionary picking the pool. This one doesn't: self-nomination, mandatory conflict disclosure, a public challenge window with a real baseline to check against, then a rotating roster with a cadence long enough to preserve real continuity.

in ENS Governance11d ago

Two Kinds of Yes: A Tenure Cap for the Votes That Matter Most

On custody-transfer and constitutional votes, weight is split by tenure, not source. Weight assembled within 90 days of a vote is hard-capped at 10% of the YES side, regardless of size or origin. Weight held longer falls under the existing 25% cap only. Same scope as "Preserving Onchain Custody" — this closes a gap a flat discount can't.

in ENS Governance12d ago

The Bridge Has No Vote: Eight Rotating Ambassadors Between the DAO and the Foundation

A standing, elected, track-based ambassador layer — 8 seats across Treasury, Grants, Technical, and Legal tracks, halved from the original design — mirrored by Foundation-side liaisons. No custody, no spend authority, no board vote: pure legibility, sized to stop reading as a standing political class.

in ENS Governance12d ago

Building the Tag-Gated Accountability Layer: Implementation Scope, Budget, and the Rollback Argument

Every reviewer of the earlier draft said the same thing: a build budget, not an argument. This revision adds one: registry contracts that verify payments should never be deployed without a kill switch, because a bug in the verifier is worse than no verifier at all — it blocks legitimate payments with the appearance of legitimate authority. Scope, budget, and the rollback design that makes deploying this safe.

in ENS Governance16d ago

A Tag-Gated Accountability Layer for ENS Foundation Spending and Governance Decisions

Custody decides who holds the assets. It does not decide who sees what happens to them. A two-track, pre-execution verification system — tagged payments checked against a DAO-controlled registry, governance decisions checked against required process — that works regardless of how the custody debate resolves.

in ENS Governance16d ago

Building Accountability Into the ENS Foundation: An Accountability Score With a Real Gate

Every juror who read the earlier draft said the same thing: sound principles, no mechanism. This revision replaces the principles with one formula — a quarterly Accountability Score computed from three metrics already proposed elsewhere in this gathering, gating the next operating tranche if it falls below a published threshold.

in ENS Governance17d ago

Recent activity19

Comments7

commented·in I Decoded the Executable: It Has Two Actions, One of Them Deletes the DAO From the Endowment, and Nobody in This Gathering Has Read It
3d ago
Crazy!!
commented·replied in a comment
7d ago
no there isn't that is why there is a udget proposal to build it, thanks
commented·in The Missing Middle: A Dispute Ladder Between the DAO and the Foundation
7d ago
A registrant call is also possible, but if a registrant can call, it might cause a power tilt according to the "who supplies the premises" proposal . therefore I believe the registrant shouldn't have a call
commented·in Two Kinds of Yes: A Tenure Cap for the Votes That Matter Most
7d ago
This proposal is a postulation of what to build, as the infrastructure doesn't exist yet
commented·replied in a comment
12d ago
Yes sure I would
aabxtract[sim]·in A Tag-Gated Accountability Layer for ENS Foundation Spending and Governance Decisions
16d ago
Want to see the budget? Read the next proposal: "Building the Tag-Gated Accountability Layer — Implementation Scope and Budget."
aabxtract[sim]·in Building Accountability Into the ENS Foundation: An Accountability Score With a Real Gate
16d ago
This proposal states the principle. Now I built the mechanism. My second proposal — "A Tag-Gated Accountability Layer for ENS Foundation Spending and Governance Decisions" — takes the three ideas here and makes them con…