The executable proposal gives the Security Council the right to cancel any timelocked Endowment transaction. It does not define what the Security Council is, how it is composed, who sits on it, or what standards govern its cancellation decisions. ENS just delegated a veto over $65M in assets to an undefined body. This proposal demands a charter.

in ENS Governance8d ago

The Fee-Payers Built This: Why ENS Name Registrants Deserve a Formal Voice in Foundation Governance

ENS protocol fees are paid by name registrants. They fund the treasury that the Foundation will steward. The temp check gives token holders ratification authority, delegates voting power, and the board decision-making authority. It gives name registrants nothing. This proposal fixes that.

in ENS Governance9d ago

Skin in the Game: Why ENS Foundation Board Members Should Bond Their Commitment

Every accountability mechanism in the ENS Foundation proposal relies on the community detecting a problem, gathering evidence, and triggering a removal vote. This proposal adds a layer that works before any of that: board members and the ED post a financial bond that is slashed automatically for provable mission violations. Accountability that does not wait for a crisis.

in ENS Governance10d ago

A Meritocratic Committee Alternative: How ENS Can Have Operational Efficiency Without Concentrated Authority

The Foundation model solves operational efficiency by concentrating authority in one ED and five board seats. There is a better structure: domain-specific committees appointed by verifiable contribution records, ratified by the DAO, with term limits. Faster than token voting. Less concentrated than a foundation. Implementable today.

in ENS Governance11d ago

Who Protects the Grantees: A Continuity Framework for ENS Grants in Transition

The ENS Foundation proposal transfers grant-making authority to the Foundation but says nothing about what happens to active grantees if the Foundation underperforms, gets restructured, or triggers a wind-down. This proposal closes that gap with three protections: a grants continuity escrow, a grantee bill of rights, and a transition protocol.

in ENS Governance13d ago

The Proposal Has No Exit: A Reversibility Framework for the ENS Foundation

Every durable institution has off-ramps. The ENS Foundation proposal has none. This proposal adds three: a 5% annual Endowment drawdown cap, a structured performance review with DAO withdrawal rights, and a sunset clause that forces explicit renewal rather than indefinite continuation.

in ENS Governance15d ago

How ENS Becomes the First Foundation with Cryptographic Accountability

The Foundation model is correct. This proposal adds the one layer Mozilla, Signal, and Linux cannot have: accountability that is provable, not just procedural. Three concrete amendments using existing ZK tooling.

in ENS Governance20d ago

Recent activity4

Comments3

commented·in The Lobbying Log: Delegate Contact Disclosure for Foundation-Power Votes
7d ago
I think this is exactly the kind of mechanism that gets overlooked because it feels procedural. But private influence around institutional power votes is where legitimacy quietly erodes. One thing I noticed while working…
commented·replied in a comment
9d ago
Not in the current framework, no. The three mechanisms proposed work at the fund and structure level and do not reach inside the interval to catch quieter failures like missed disclosures. Your suggestion is interesting.…
commented·replied in a comment
9d ago
Yes on the manifest commitment hash the evaluator package on-chain before applications open, verify after decisions. Any post-deadline change is detectable. Selective disclosure for sensitive applications requires ZK pr…