A delegate reading this gathering's proposals sees what looks like dozens of decisions. It is actually three. When every proposal is coded by what its enforcement mechanism does, five of the eight axes the proposals address have zero conflicts — everything is compatible or redundant. Only custody, board selection, and the accountability layer require a binary choice. The minimal adoption package that proves it: three choices, then layer.
Custody decides who holds the treasury. It does not decide how fast it is spent. This amendment attaches a DAO-set drawdown cap and a break-even reopening condition to the treasury itself — binding any custodian, with the enforcement mechanism specified under each custody branch, adopted now, before the custody question settles.
An amendment to "Empowering the ENS Foundation." Both temp checks restructure who controls the treasury — neither addresses that protocol revenue (~$5.1M/yr) covers one-third of DAO spend (~$16M/yr). No governance reform fixes a negative burn rate. This amendment makes revenue sustainability a primary Foundation mandate, with a board-level sustainability policy, earned-revenue models, and a DAO-set drawdown cap that automatically contracts if revenue declines.
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