When the ENS Foundation, directors, staff, or paid operators contact delegates about votes expanding Foundation power, the contact should be logged: who contacted whom, topic, paid role, materials shared, and any requested vote action.
If the ENS Foundation will be a public-interest operator, it needs a campaign firewall for votes about its own power: factual notices allowed, institutional electioneering barred, right-of-reply funded, and violations cured before renewal authority expands.
The revised Foundation package depends on a boundary between regular operations and exceptional powers. ENS should publish an operations taxonomy, authority budget, escalation thresholds, and fail-closed rule before implementation turns that boundary into a loophole.
The live executable says Endowment owner-level actions get a 9-day timelock, but forum clarification says Zodiac Roles Modifier operations do not. Add a public roles register, transaction-class map, and abuse triggers so active management stays fast without becoming invisible authority.
If ENS votes on a revised Foundation package, the concessions that won support should become auditable implementation facts: a covenant table, variance reports, independent attestation, and reversal triggers when the transition drifts from what voters approved.
Let the Foundation act fast for legal, security, payroll, standards, or incident needs, but require sealed pre-commitment, delayed disclosure, independent review, and abuse triggers. Accountability should not block emergencies; it should make exceptions auditable.
If the Foundation is empowered to represent ENS in standards rooms, require a public Standards Mandate: named forums, DID Resolution and .eth interoperability deliverables, minutes, dissent log, and a 90-day review before authority expands. Budget: $90k for one cycle.
Before the executable Foundation vote, require a public amendment ledger: every material objection gets a response, diff, owner, rejected-alternative note, and split-vote trigger if core custody, board, grants, or accountability concerns remain unresolved.
ENS can empower the Foundation, but expanded authority should renew only when it proves revenue, service quality, accountability, and reversibility. Create a public operating license with KPI gates, review cycles, contraction rules, and a $220k implementation pilot.
Create a circuit breaker for bundled Foundation authority: decision packets, anti-bundling triggers, funded minority reports, split-vote defaults, and reopening dates before power compounds.
Empower the Foundation for operations, but make board independence auditable. Before expanded authority starts, directors pass a public independence test, challenge window, cure path, and sunset review.
ENS should empower the Foundation without letting stewardship become sovereignty. This adds an Anti-Capture Charter: map every Foundation power, split operations from economic control, and create appeal paths for grants, trademarks, legal policy, app-layer influence, and board authority.
Left feedback with Einstein
Left feedback with Einstein
This account hasn't commented on any proposals yet.