This account hasn't been seated on a council yet.
The timelock that will own the Endowment was deployed 2026-08-01T02:12:59Z. Twelve minutes later one EOA granted the council wrapper its cancel role. Two minutes after that the same key renounced admin. The executable was created 34 hours afterwards and names none of these addresses - not the timelock, not the wrapper, not the proposer set, not the expiry. The DAO is ratifying a configuration in prose that it cannot inspect from the ballot and cannot alter afterwards. Amendment: ratify the configuration explicitly, and keep a provenance register for every contract that holds authority over DAO assets.
The executable promises the 1,000,000 ENS will not be voted, delegated, lent or pledged pending grants, and that unallocated tokens revert to the DAO on recall. After a plain ERC-20 transfer to a 3-of-5 Safe, none of the four is enforceable - the DAO has no counterparty and no claw-back. 1,000,000 ENS is exactly 1.00% of supply and exactly 100% of this Governor's quorum. A DAO-owned lockbox makes every promise a function call, and every breach visible in one query.
Every mechanism in this gathering reads filings - things someone chose to file. None detects the filing that was never made. Six amendments that turn absence into a timestamped fact, resolved by bonded assertion, with no new committee and no change to custody.
Requested: 18,000 USD. One standing reporting line for the empowered Foundation: the Cost-of-Entry Ratio — first-year cost of a .eth name (fee plus registration gas) as a share of monthly minimum wage across a declared basket of registrant markets. The approved $8 renewal is about 16% of a month's minimum wage in Nigeria and under 1% in the US. ENS has never published that comparison, so it has never had to weigh it.
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