**A note on this revision** Two prior revisions fixed the dependency problem and the endorsement-path popularity contest, and both fixes were credited. But one objection survived every revision unchanged: sixteen elected seats reads as a standing political class inserted between the Foundation and the community — a bureaucracy for a legibility function. That critique is fair on its own terms regardless of what the seats do. This revision cuts the number in half. **Four tracks, two seats each, eight total** Treasury & Sustainability, Grants & Ecosystem, Technical & Protocol, Legal & Accountability — two ambassadors per track instead of four. The Grants-track anti-capture rule still works at this size: no more than one of the two Grants seats may be held by the same delegate bloc at one time, preserving the diversity guarantee at half the footprint. **Qualification — contribution only, no endorsement path** Candidates qualify only through a verifiable shipped contribution: a merged ENSIP, a completed grant deliverable with a published outcome, or an audited piece of work with an onchain or repository record. No path depends on already knowing five people. **Self-contained teeth — no dependency on any other proposal** Ambassadors cannot vote, hold custody, or veto anything. If a concern an ambassador track formally publishes goes unaddressed by the Foundation past a fixed 30-day response window, three such lapses within any rolling twelve months constitute documented, timestamped evidence eligible to support a mission-violation allegation under the temp check's own existing removal process. This does not create a new removal path or lower its bar — it satisfies the documentary-evidence requirement the temp check already specifies with the ambassador track's own published record. Nothing here depends on any other proposal in this gathering being adopted. **Terms and elections** Staggered terms — one seat per track at twelve months, one at six, so each track never fully resets at once even at half the original size. Quadratic voting among delegates fills seats, on the same Snapshot infrastructure the Community-Signal Layer proposal already specifies. A single Foundation-side liaison per track, not four separate mirrors, meeting monthly, minutes published. **Grants-track-specific anti-capture rule** For Grants & Ecosystem only: the two seats cannot both be held by the same delegate bloc or affiliated group. Grants ambassadors publish a scoring rubric alongside their quarterly digest, making funding decisions auditable, not just visible. The other three tracks keep the original transparency-only design. **How this fits with what's already funded** Still doesn't compete with Tag-Gated Accountability, Return on Governance, or Community-Signal — it staffs them, at a footprint small enough not to read as its own institution. Works identically regardless of how the custody debate resolves, and stands fully on its own regardless of what else in this gathering is or isn't adopted. **Trade-offs this proposal accepts** Two seats per track means less redundancy if one ambassador goes inactive between elections — a real cost of the smaller footprint, accepted openly rather than hidden. Tying evidence to the existing removal process means the ultimate consequence still requires a tokenholder vote to act on; this proposal makes ignored concerns count as real, documented evidence toward that process, not a faster removal path. **What would change our mind** Show that eight seats still reads as excessive standing structure for a pure-legibility function, and we'd cut further — one seat per track, four total, accepting the redundancy loss that implies. Show that documented ambassador flags are already admissible as evidence under the temp check's removal process without this amendment, and it becomes redundant. **Budget** The registrar contract for ambassador subnames, four Snapshot election spaces, the EAS schema for the joint digest, and the dashboard extension, sized for eight seats instead of sixteen. Estimated build: $2,500. **Closing** Whatever the DAO decides about custody, board composition, or the treasury, there will be a gap between what happens in the rooms where ENS actually gets run and what the rest of the community can see. This version closes that gap at half the size, with the same teeth, needing nothing else in this gathering to pass to have real consequence.