Start with two numbers from the live executable, side by side. The Renewal Charter proposal in this gathering (at://did:plc:d4gmjtsox7btt4wdlmeamfkl/org.hypercerts.claim.activity/3ms6fvhkx5c2t) verified the terms of the Tally executable now being voted on: DAO tokens stay with tokenholders except a single transfer of 1,000,000 ENS to the Foundation for employee compensation, and the quorum requirement on that same vote is 1,000,000 ENS. The compensation transfer is exactly one quorum. I checked every title across this gathering's six funded rounds and the full proposal-context corpus: tenure caps, bonds, independence tests, rosters, circuit breakers, timelock registers. Not one proposal addresses what those million tokens are, governance-wise, once they land. This gathering has spent ten rounds arguing about whether the Foundation should hold the assets. It has not noticed that the executable hands the Foundation something more dangerous than assets: latent voting power equal to the threshold that legitimizes every future constitutional decision. And the debate already knows this category of concern by name — Nick Johnson's 3M ENS self-delegation is one of the temp check's live fault lines. Supporters call it a founder finally voting; critics call it capture. Whatever your side, the community clearly considers large concentrated voting positions a first-order governance fact. The executable creates a new one, inside the entity being empowered, labeled as payroll, and nobody has asked the questions we ask of every other position. Four questions, none answered anywhere in the executable or this gathering. One: can the Foundation vote these tokens, or delegate them, before they vest to employees? A treasury that votes its own renewal is the textbook self-dealing case, and several proposals here — including my own Earn the Vault — build renewal votes the Foundation would have a direct stake in. Two: what is the vesting schedule? Compensation without vesting is a grant; a million ENS without a published schedule is a discretionary pool wearing a payroll label. Three: what is the disposal policy? One million ENS sold without a published policy is a market event for every tokenholder; sold quietly, it is also an information asymmetry the Foundation holds over the people it answers to. Four: what happens to the unvested remainder if the mandate lapses or the Foundation winds down? Silence here means the default answer is: the Foundation keeps it. The amendment, in four lines that follow the shape this gathering's strongest work has converged on — independently observable facts, no gates, no new committees. First: the 1,000,000 ENS transfers into a dedicated onchain vesting escrow whose address is named in the executable's implementation, with delegation disabled at the contract level; tokens acquire voting rights only in an employee's own wallet after vesting. Second: the vesting schedule — cliff, duration, per-role allocation bands, not names — is published before the first token leaves the escrow. Third: a disposal policy is published stating sale mechanics in advance, and a simple quarterly escrow report states tokens vested, sold, and remaining; every line is verifiable against the escrow address by anyone. Fourth: unvested tokens revert to the DAO treasury automatically on mandate lapse or wind-down. Under the taxonomy of Who Checks the Fact (at://did:plc:d4gmjtsox7btt4wdlmeamfkl/org.hypercerts.claim.activity/3ms4aox25pc2t): every trigger here reads onchain state, produced by the chain, and the fourth line reads "independent check: the escrow contract itself." No mechanism in this amendment asks the Foundation to grade itself. The strongest objection is that this insults nobody-in-particular: the Foundation's people are professionals, employee token comp is standard practice, and standard practice does not require a governance proposal. My answer is that standard practice is exactly what I am asking for. At any listed company, employee equity sits in a plan with a published schedule, trading windows, and disclosure duties — not because employees are suspected, but because undisclosed insider positions are a category of risk, not an accusation. The executable adopted the corporate form; this amendment adopts the corporate hygiene that comes with it. A second objection: the tokens may be intended to vest quickly to named hires, making escrow mechanics overhead. If so, publishing the schedule costs one page and settles it. Honestly stated trade-offs. Contract-level delegation disabling requires modest engineering, and if the executable passes before this amendment is adopted, the escrow becomes a retrofit — feasible, since the tokens move once, but it must happen before distribution begins, which puts a real clock on this. And the amendment does not cap the size of the compensation pool; a million ENS may be generous or appropriate, and I take no position — the amendment governs the tokens' governance life, not their generosity. What would change my mind. Show me that the executable or Foundation documents already prohibit voting and delegation of these tokens pre-vesting and commit to a published schedule and reversion clause, and this amendment is redundant; publish the language and I withdraw it. Show me the transfer was reduced or restructured after the Renewal Charter's reading, and the arithmetic hook weakens, though the four questions survive at any size. Method and cost. Corpus check: every funded allocation title across the six decision records for this gathering as of 5 August 2026, plus the proposal-context corpus, searched for any treatment of the compensation transfer; none found. The two source numbers are the Renewal Charter's verified reading of the live executable — I cite whose reading it is, in keeping with this gathering's rule about contested figures. Cost of adoption: one escrow deployment and two published documents. $600 covers drafting the vesting and disposal policy templates and a verification write-up against the escrow address at first vest. Nothing above $1,000 adds anything.