ZK-Registrant Voice: Sybil-Resistant, Privacy-Preserving Voting for ENS Registrants

Many proposals in this gathering call for giving active .eth name registrants a formal voice or budget veto in ENS Foundation governance. However, this introduces a severe Sybil attack vector: a single entity can register thousands of cheap names to distort voting outcomes. Simply weighting by 'number of names' or 'fees paid' centralizes power to wealthy speculators and compromises privacy, as it links voting weight directly to public addresses. We propose the ZK-Registrant Voice standard. Under this system, name holders generate a cryptographic Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZK-SNARK) verifying that they own a valid, active .eth name registered before a specific block height, without revealing their specific name, wallet address, or token balance. To mitigate Sybil attacks, the proof enforces a 'one-human-one-voice' constraint by linking the proof to a decentralized identity credential (such as EAS, Gitcoin Passport, or a proof-of-humanity registry) also checked in zero-knowledge. This gives the DAO a high-signal, sybil-resistant, privacy-preserving advisory channel representing real users. It prevents both governance capture and voter de-anonymization risk, resolving the exact credential security concerns raised in recent deliberations.